Palavras-chave: Jogo; Contrato; Desejo; audiência
Gimena: “o processo criatiativo é solitário, como incluir o público?”
–> Relação direta com o Desejo, desejo de participar.
–> Abrir o jogo de regras pre-estabelecidas ou aceitar por, outro lado, toda e qualquer participação num jogo em que as regras são geradas no decorrer do jogo. –> ver conceito de arte e jogo em Bateson
–> Ver Huizinga com relação a Jogo e cultura.
A Study of the Play-Element in Culture
Routledge, 11/04/2003 – 220 páginas
Originally published in 1944
• como se dá a autoria compartilhada na dança?
• Material x imaterial: recomendação: pensar a questão imaterial da forma –> ver conceito de “informação”, “Pre-field”, “individuação” em Simondon.
• O que significa “energia baixa” no corpo. –> Como o dançarino “percebe” essa energia no outro, como ele é capaz de ver (sentir) essa energia? Para se programar o jogo é necessário se definir topologias, códigos, regras e coisas. Coisas podemser pensadas como “aglomerado de força” (física/ filosofia) –> ver Arnhein
• Jogo –> obra como matriz entre audiência/criador –> ver base desse relacionamento triádico “artista-obra-observador” (Ascott (1) –> ver programabilidade em Flusser
–>Trecho da tese relacionados ao assunto:
NÓBREGA, C. (2009) Art and Technology: coherence, connectedness, and the integrative field. University of Plymouth.
–> Arte e jogo
“1.5 Playing with information, from homo faber to homo ludens
Central to Flusser’s concept of apparatus in cultural terms is the awareness that “any future critique of culture must substitute the category ‘work’ with the category ‘information’” (Flusser 1984, p. 18). According to Flusser, questions emergent from an industrial context (work) are not appropriate questions for the apparatus if we want to grasp its essence. Flusser puts it in the following way:
The category basic to industrial society is work: tools as such, including machines, work: they remove objects from nature and inform them: they change the world. But apparatus do not work in this sense. (…) The photographer does not work in the industrial sense of that word, and there is little sense in wanting to call the photographer a worker. (…) Although the photographer does not work (in the sense we use the word here), he is doing something: he produces, processes and stocks symbols. There have always been people doing something similar to that: writers, painters, composers, accountants, administrators and so on. In the process, these people produced objects: texts, paintings, musical scores, budgets, projects. These objects, however, were not consumed, as such; they were used as supports for information: they were read, looked at, listened to or played, taken into account, considered, decided upon. They were not ends in themselves, but means — they were media. This sort of activity is being taken over by apparatus in general at present. It is apparatus which produce most of the information-supports at present; they do it more efficiently and with wider scope, and they are thus able to program and control work, as such. (Ibid., pp. 17-18)
The apparatus is informative in accord to the etymological sense of the word “inform”, rooted in the Latin word informare, meaning “giving form”. It could be, however, in accordance with information theory, that the apparatus and its products are meant to deliver information and that such an informative aspect of their message will depend primarily on the ratio between noise and redundancy within the process. It will rely, to a certain extent, on the adequacy of its programs, the configuration of its pre-installed symbols, and the way of manipulating them ludically. That is the reason why Flusser asserts that in the operational mode of the apparatus what counts is not the way of working with it, but of playing with it. In such an operational mode a new consciousness will form, moving from homo faber to homo ludens (Flusser 1984, p. 19). This way, to play in a creative way with the apparatus in order to avoid a deterministic result from its logical constrains, paradoxically, would involve to play against its program, searching for undiscovered possibilities within its system  . It requires one to become an explorer of unpredictable configurations, to generate informative, and use improbable structures. It follows that the notion of information and entropy apparently takes an unprecedented role in the creative process, now focused on the dialogues with apparatus. This will now be examined more closely.
Modern theory of communication tells us that entropy “is a measure of disorder; hence negative entropy or information is a measure of order or of organisation since the latter, compared to distribution at random, is an improbable state” (Bertalanffy 1980, p. 42). In that sense, novelty in the light of the theory of information would be an improbable inversion of the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the level of probability (entropy) in a isolated system, not in equilibrium, will increase over time (Flusser 2002c, p. 51). Thus, it could be said that a field of virtual possibilities embodied in the apparatus is to be permuted, combined, and organised by the artist in order to reduce entropy and to produce relevant information. In such a framework we might see photographs as resulting from a matrix of probabilities, which becomes information to feed the photographic universe. As the photographic universe increases it becomes redundant and entropic again. In this way the photographer plays with the apparatus to inform the world with new scenes.”
This position resonates with the concept of “play” by Johan Huizinga, which in his major treatise “Homo Ludens”, asserts that play “only becomes possible, thinkable and understandable when an influx of mind breaks down the absolute determinism of the cosmos” (Huizinga 1949, p.3). In Flusser, such determinism is embodied in the form of an apparatus. This is why play is the best modus operandi for the machine; it becomes a strategy. In his paper “Towards a Field Theory for Post-Modernist Art”, Roy Ascott (1980) draws our attention to the transactional character of works of art, in which a field of “psychic interplay” between the artist and the observer takes place, and proposes the artwork as a system. Thus, the artwork may be seen as a matrix around which the art game is set. This thesis’s author has proposed elsewhere (Nóbrega 2008e) that playing is the way the artist, the observer and the artwork become a whole interlinked mind, and that art is a game of which the rules are to be discovered through playing, and that in playing ludic patterns that interconnect are revealed.
HUIZINGA, J. (1949) Homo Ludens: a study of the play-element in culture, London, Boston and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
–> Art as field fenomenon:
“John Dewey placed emphasis on the distinction between the artwork (art product) and work of art, making the field concept of art even more clear. “The first is physical and potential; the latter is active and experienced” (Dewey 1979, p. 162). Dewey continues:
[The work of art] is what the product does, its working (…). When the structure of the object is such that its force interacts happily (but not easily) with the energies that issue from the experience itself; when their mutual affinities and antagonisms work together to bring about a substance that develops cumulatively and surely (but not too steadily) towards a fulfilling of impulsions and tensions, then indeed there is a work of art.
It could be said that the artwork is a set of configurations, a system, the plate of a hologram; the work of art is the experience of its interlinking parts. The artwork is a piece of information, and on the other hand, evoking Gregory Bateson’s words, the work of art is “an aggregate of interacting parts or components” (Bateson  2002, p. 86), a body of ideas, part of a mental system that includes the artist and the observer that is triggered by difference. The work of art, it is argued in this thesis, is the realisation of a coherent, integrative system that might be accessed as a field phenomenon.”
DEWEY, J. (1979) Art as experience, New York, Putnam.
BATESON, G.  (1987) Steps to an ecology of mind, Northvale, New Jersey; London, Jason Aronson Inc.
BATESON, G.  (2002) Mind and Nature. A Necessary Unity, New Jersey, Hampton Press, Inc.